When Canada’s prime minister stood beside Xi Jinping in Beijing in January 2026 and spoke of “adapting to the world as it is,” it sounded like realism. In truth, it was resignation. History has never been kind to nations that confuse accommodation with prudence, especially when dealing with a one-party state that treats diplomacy as an extension of control rather than cooperation.
This visit the first Canadian leadership visit to China since 2017 was presented as a “reset.” Tariffs were eased, handshakes exchanged, and a new “strategic partnership” announced. But beneath the ceremony lies a familiar pattern: Beijing offers short-term economic relief in exchange for long-term leverage, while its counterpart convinces itself that this time will be different.
Canada agreed to sharply reduce tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, allowing nearly 49,000 Chinese EVs into its market at just over 6%, down from the 100% imposed in 2024. In return, China reduced punitive tariffs on Canadian canola from roughly 85% to about 15%. These numbers were trumpeted as wins. Yet they remain conditional, reversible, and politically weaponised just like every previous Chinese “concession.” Canadian farmers remember this lesson well: canola was never sanctioned for economic reasons, but for political punishment. What was imposed overnight can be withdrawn just as quickly.
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s remark “We take the world as it is, not as we wish it to be” may sound sober, but it quietly abandons the idea that democratic states should shape the world rather than submit to it. Beijing, by contrast, has no such hesitation. Xi Jinping spoke during the visit about “peace,” “stability,” and “mutual respect.” These words ring hollow when placed against China’s actual record.
Xi is the last person qualified to lecture the world on peace. Under his leadership, China has escalated military pressure on Taiwan, violated agreements in the South China Sea, intensified coercion against Japan in the East China Sea, and repeatedly clashed with India along the Himalayan border including deadly encounters in Ladakh despite prior disengagement agreements. These are not accidents. They are features of a system that sees borders, rules, and treaties as tools, not limits.
The visa-free travel announcement for Canadians was paraded as proof of goodwill. In reality, it is one of the most deceptive gestures Beijing deploys. China’s visa policies are famously elastic welcoming when useful, punitive when convenient. Foreign nationals continue to be arbitrarily stopped, interrogated, detained, or banned from leaving. The recent detention of a woman from northeast London at a Chinese airport, despite holding valid documents, is not an exception but a reminder: entry into China is never a right, only a privilege granted and revoked by the Party. Visa waivers do not protect travellers from “exit bans,” vague national-security laws, or politicised law enforcement.
At the core of this pattern lies ideology. The Chinese Communist Party is not merely authoritarian; it is ideological to its bones. Rooted in Marxism-Leninism and hardened under Xi into a personalist, nationalist command system, the Party views economic exchange as a means of control. Trade is not mutual dependence it is asymmetric dependence. Countries that grow reliant on Chinese markets quickly discover that silence is the price of access. This has played out across Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and parts of the Pacific, where infrastructure loans, trade incentives, and market access have translated into political pressure, policy alignment, and quiet compliance.
Canada is not immune. Intelligence agencies have already warned of Chinese political interference, elite capture, and surveillance of diaspora communities. Economic engagement does not dilute this behaviour; it emboldens it. Beijing does not compartmentalise trade and politics it fuses them.
The danger, then, is not that Canada is talking to China. Diplomacy is necessary. The danger is mistaking tactical calm for strategic change. Nothing in Beijing’s structure has shifted. Nothing in Xi’s doctrine suggests restraint. Nothing in the Communist Party’s behaviour indicates a retreat from coercion, expansionism, or ideological rivalry with liberal democracies.
History is clear on one point: authoritarian systems offer peace when it serves them, and pressure when it doesn’t. Canada’s January 2026 visit may reduce friction for a season, but it deepens exposure for a generation. Tariffs can be re-imposed. Visas can be cancelled. Markets can be closed. Influence, once embedded, is far harder to remove.
