China’s electrification narrative is built on a simple premise: cut reliance on fossil fuels by turning everything electric cars, buses, logistics fleets, data centres, robots, AI infrastructure, and grid storage. In 2025, global electric vehicle sales surpassed 20 million units, driven overwhelmingly by China, which accounted for around 70 % of global EV production and saw more than half of all new car sales domestically come from electric or plug-in hybrid models. This is not a tentative shift it is a systemic transformation of transportation and industry.
Powering this transformation is a pair of closely related Chinese successes: the EV battery sector and an insatiable demand for electricity. China already produces more than 70 % of the world’s lithium-ion batteries, and industry capacity is projected to expand rapidly with analysts saying production could double or more by 2030. According to Ouyang Minggao, a leading Chinese battery scientist, the sector could eventually be worth trillions of yuan, reinforcing China’s role as the linchpin of the global battery ecosystem.
Chinese officials describe this as part of a broader national strategy to lead the future of mobility and energy. At the political level, President Xi Jinping has pushed for structural shifts toward low-carbon energy and industrial leadership, framing electrification and clean technology as necessary for China’s energy security and international competitiveness. In a 2025 address to party officials, Xi criticized unbalanced investments in AI and EV industries but his critique was about market overheating, not the strategic pursuit of these sectors.
From Beijing’s perspective, this electrification is a pillar of China’s climate commitments it’s part of a suite of policies aimed at reducing carbon intensity and reorienting the economy toward non-fossil energy sources, even as coal remains a large part of the energy mix. But this macro framing obscures the local consequences of how China is actually producing power and harnessing materials.
Because batteries need electricity and electric grids need base load, China has leaned aggressively on hydropower. This is where Tibet- long called the Asian Water Tower enters the picture. The plateau feeds some of Asia’s largest rivers, offering steep gradients perfect for hydropower. In 2025, Beijing greenlit the Medog (Motuo) hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo, with a planned capacity near 60 gigawatts- roughly three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam and projected annual generation in the hundreds of billions of kilowatt-hours. It is expected to become a cornerstone of China’s energy supply for industrial electrification.
Officials call such “clean” energy development a contribution to global climate goals and domestic stability. But the reality on the ground is more complex. Hydropower plants in high-altitude, seismically active regions like Tibet carry unique risks of ecosystem disruption, sediment trapping, altered downstream flows, and serious consequences for water availability in South Asia. They also demand vast construction resources, infrastructure networks, and relocation of communities. Tibetan families, monasteries, and pastures find themselves in the path of megaproject schemes whose benefits are primarily external to their homeland.
Batteries, meanwhile, need minerals and China knows this. The Qinghai Tibet Plateau holds significant deposits of lithium, essential for EV batteries. Research indicates that a large proportion of China’s domestic lithium supply potential is located in this region. China’s drive to secure raw materials for its battery industry has unleashed mineral exploration and extraction pressure across Tibetan lands. This dual squeeze rivers for power, minerals for batteries defines the environmental stakes.
Chinese battery makers like CATL, the world’s largest EV battery producer, are pushing into new sectors at breakneck speed. CATL executives have publicly forecast that electric vehicles could expand to encompass half of China’s heavy truck market by 2028, a dramatic shift from single-digit penetration only a few years prior. This projected growth underscores just how deeply embedded electric mobility has become in China’s industrial strategy and how much continuous energy and materials it will require.
This industrial expansion has broader environmental implications. Studies of battery electric vehicle usage in China show that the overall demand for electricity and the associated carbon emissions continue to rise even as vehicles themselves become more efficient. Real-world data reveals that electricity consumption by EV fleets has risen dramatically alongside sales, highlighting the unavoidable link between EV proliferation and grid demand.
All of this plays out against a backdrop of ecological fragility. The Tibetan Plateau is already warming faster than the global average; glaciers are retreating, permafrost is thawing, and grasslands are degrading. Embedding large hydropower and mining infrastructure into an ecosystem already stressed by climate change risks amplifying ecological feedback loops and long-term instability.
The world may celebrate China’s command of electrification and battery dominance, but the source of that power the rivers and minerals of Tibet tells a more unsettled story.
