In the mist-shrouded heights of Davos, Switzerland, where elites gather annually to chant the gospel of globalisation, China’s Vice Premier He Lifeng delivered a performance that sounds less like plain truth and more like spun silk. His words were meant to soothe, to show China as a peaceful booster of trade and harmony. But when measured against stark facts and global sentiment, the rhetoric creaks like ancient timber in a storm.
On January 20 2026, at the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting, He proclaimed that China’s journey since joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been one of faithful compliance with rules, fulfilling obligations and even taking on extra responsibilities. He stressed that China has not sought special or differential treatment in WTO negotiations, and that it will uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system centred on the WTO. He urged equality before trade rules and warned against a return to “law of the jungle” economics.
This is the line he wants the world to hear: that China’s rise stems from cooperation, not domination; that China seeks an open market and invites others into its own; that it is a partner, not a threat. He framed global trade tensions as symptoms of protectionism and unilateralism, and urged nations to resist fragmentation and tariffs that would drive the world into isolation.
But listen closely, and the cadence fails to align with clear realities:
For starters, China’s economic ascent since WTO accession in December 2001 has been nothing short of meteoric from a relatively mid-tier economy to the second largest in the world, with export and import flows measured in the trillions and a trade presence that dwarfs most nations. Yet this rise has not unfolded on equally balanced terms. Critics point out that China’s model has relied on massive state-backed subsidies, internal market protections, and strategic industrial policies factors that create distortions rather than pure free-market competition. These structural elements are at odds with the classical liberal trade order that the WTO was designed to safeguard.
When He says China strictly adheres to WTO rules, remember that many WTO members especially the United States and European Union have repeatedly flagged Chinese practices as inconsistent with market principles and fair competition, leading to a surge in trade disputes and national countermeasures. China’s record trade surplus in recent years reported at roughly USD 1.2 trillion is presented by Beijing as benign or even unintentional, but it has fuelled anxiety abroad and triggered tariffs, investigations, and protective responses.
He’s claim that China refuses special treatment is technically correct only in a narrow sense. But that claim obscures decades of negotiation where China’s unique economic model deeply shaped by state direction has been accommodated rather than fundamentally reformed. WTO members have been forced into hundreds of trade inquiries and countermeasures to address what they view as unfair advantages a sign that the “rules” have been tested far beyond their original scope.
He’s insistence on equality before rules rings hollow against the backdrop of the persistent trade frictions that have emerged: from disputes over intellectual property protections and domestic subsidies to accusations of discriminatory treatment against foreign firms. If every nation were truly equal before trade rules, these contests wouldn’t recur with such frequency and intensity.
And while China presents its policies as a bulwark against protectionism, it often frames legitimate foreign trade defences as dangerous unilateralism charging other nations with violating WTO principles even as Beijing itself retreats behind non-market mechanisms that are hard to fit into WTO jurisprudence.
Thus the issue is not just semantics whether China says it supports the WTO or claims not to seek special privileges but whether the structure of global rules has been upheld in spirit and effect. WTO membership was meant to tether all economies to a shared system of predictable norms. Instead, China’s integration has revealed the limits of those norms when applied to a state-led model that strategically exploits openness for asymmetric gain.
What He Lifeng offered at Davos was a tapestry of hopeful imagery cooperation, openness, mutual benefit. But just as a silk painting can conceal the rough wood of its frame, his words conceal deeper tensions: between rhetoric and reality, between ideological claims and economic practice. For many observers especially in democratic nations bearing the brunt of Chinese trade imbalances and industrial competition these are not merely diplomatic disagreements but glaring inconsistencies that reach to the heart of the WTO’s relevance
